Do non-local CEOs affect environmental, social and governance performance?

被引:6
作者
Huang, Min [1 ]
Li, Mengyao [2 ]
Li, Xiaobo [3 ]
机构
[1] Renmin Univ China, Sch Business, Beijing, Peoples R China
[2] Harbin Inst Technol Shenzhen, Sch Econ & Management, Shenzhen, Peoples R China
[3] Xiamen Univ, Sch Management, Xiamen, Peoples R China
关键词
Non-local CEOs; ESG performance; Intergroup relations perspective; Previous ESG decoupling; Firm visibility; Firm slack; CORPORATE; MANAGEMENT; RESPONSIBILITY; FAVORITISM; DISCLOSURE; IMPACT; TIES; CSR; ESG;
D O I
10.1108/MD-07-2022-1004
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
PurposeBuilding on the intergroup relations perspective on the social identity theory, the authors examine whether firms' environmental, social and governance (ESG) varies when local firms have non-local CEOs. Additionally, the authors examine which contextual factors may strengthen or weaken the effectiveness of ESG in helping non-local CEOs garner trust, legitimacy and resources support from local stakeholders.Design/methodology/approachPooled OLS regressions, based on unbalanced panel data and controlling for year and industry fixed effects, were estimated using a sample composed of 836 Chinese A-share listed firms that have Bloomberg ESG disclosure scores data from 2006 to 2019.FindingsResults suggest that companies with non-local CEOs, who are perceived as outgroup members by the local stakeholders, would lead to a higher level of ESG performance to overcome the intergroup bias they face. In addition, results also show that companies with a lower level of previous ESG decoupling and having more slack will mitigate the relationship between non-local CEOs and ESG performance. Conversely, firm visibility at a high level will promote the positive relationship between non-local CEOs and ESG performance.Originality/valueThis study offers theoretical insights that extend the focus of intragroup relation to outgroup identity, by introducing an intergroup relations lens to explore how outgroup (or nonprototypical) leaders utilize ESG to counter intergroup bias they suffer. Moreover, this study also extends current literature focusing on non-local CEOs and ESG performance.
引用
收藏
页码:2354 / 2373
页数:20
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