On the centrality analysis of covert networks using games with externalities

The identification of the most potentially hazardous agents in a terrorist organisation helps to prevent further attacks by effectively allocating surveillance resources and destabilising the covert network to which they belong. In this paper, several mechanisms for the overall ranking of covert networks members in a general framework are addressed based on their contribution to the overall relative effectiveness in the event of a merger. In addition, the possible organisation of agents outside of each possible merger naturally influences their relative effectiveness score, which motivates the innovative use of games in partition function form and specific ranking indices for individuals. Finally, we apply these methods to analyse the effectiveness of the hijackers of the covert network supporting the 9/11 attacks.(c) 2023 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ )