Proprietarily or Open? Online Credit Offering Strategy for a Platform-Based Retailer

被引:1
作者
Li, Quan [1 ]
Zha, Yong [1 ]
Wu, Jie [1 ]
Liang, Liang [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Sci & Technol China, Int Inst Finance, Sch Management, Hefei 230026, Peoples R China
[2] Hefei Univ Technol, Sch Management, Hefei 230009, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金; 中国博士后科学基金;
关键词
Costs; Supply chains; Investment; Streams; Psychology; Economic indicators; Credit cards; Consumer credit; co-opetition; online retail platform; platform-based supply chain; supply chain management; DEBT; COMPETITION; PRICE; CARD;
D O I
10.1109/TEM.2023.3313590
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Online retail platforms are increasingly interested in offering online credit to consumers. These platforms act as resellers or marketplaces, building the reseller and agency channels. The platform may offer credit only to consumers who purchase in the reseller channel, i.e., proprietarily, or in both channels, i.e., openly. In this article, we develop a game-theoretical model to investigate how the platform's credit strategy affects the co-opetition between the platform and seller. Consumers are heterogeneous in their preferences for the purchase channel and payment mode. Online credit may bring a positive or negative credit yield rate for the platform, depending on the interest, credit risk, and return on investment. We find that the credit offering may increase both the platform and seller's prices when the credit yield rate is positive or the misfit cost is low. When the credit yield rate is negative or the misfit cost is low, proprietary credit will increase the seller's demand. Furthermore, the platform has no incentive to offer credit when the credit yield rate is negative and the misfit cost is low. Interestingly, the platform will proprietarily offer credit when the misfit cost is high, even if the credit yield rate is negative. The platform will openly offer credit when the credit yield rate is positive and the misfit cost is low. A negative (positive) credit effect to consumers will increases (decreases) the platform's incentive to offer credit openly. A correlation between the purchase channel and payment mode reduces the platform's incentive to offer credit.
引用
收藏
页码:8990 / 9002
页数:13
相关论文
共 45 条
[1]   Frenemies in Platform Markets: Heterogeneous Profit Foci as Drivers of Compatibility Decisions [J].
Adner, Ron ;
Chen, Jianqing ;
Zhu, Feng .
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 2020, 66 (06) :2432-2451
[2]   Do Payment Mechanisms Change the Way Consumers Perceive Products? [J].
Chatterjee, Promothesh ;
Rose, Randall L. .
JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH, 2012, 38 (06) :1129-1139
[3]   Channel Expansion Strategies in the Presence of Asymmetric Competitive Retail Platforms [J].
Dai, Bin ;
Yang, Xi ;
Wang, Chen ;
Wang, Minglu ;
Xie, Xia .
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT, 2024, 71 :2951-2972
[4]   Where Does Debt Fit in the Stress Process Model? [J].
Drentea, Patricia ;
Reynolds, John R. .
SOCIETY AND MENTAL HEALTH, 2015, 5 (01) :16-32
[5]   CREDIT CARDS AS SPENDING FACILITATING STIMULI - A CONDITIONING INTERPRETATION [J].
FEINBERG, RA .
JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH, 1986, 13 (03) :348-356
[6]   Online Product Reviews-Triggered Dynamic Pricing: Theory and Evidence [J].
Feng, Juan ;
Li, Xin ;
Zhang, Xiaoquan .
INFORMATION SYSTEMS RESEARCH, 2019, 30 (04) :1107-1123
[7]   Supplier Encroachment, Information Sharing, and Channel Structure in Online Retail Platforms [J].
Ha, Albert Y. ;
Luo, Huajiang ;
Shang, Weixin .
PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT, 2022, 31 (03) :1235-1251
[8]  
Hagiu Andrei., 2007, Review of Network Economics, V6, DOI DOI 10.2202/1446-9022.1113
[9]   On the psychology of poverty [J].
Haushofer, Johannes ;
Fehr, Ernst .
SCIENCE, 2014, 344 (6186) :862-867
[10]  
He S., 2020, INFORM SYST RES, V31, P1037