Undetermined Choices, Luck and the Enhancement Problem

被引:1
作者
Elzein, Nadine [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Warwick, Dept Philosophy, Social Sci Bldg, Coventry CV4 7AL, W Midlands, England
关键词
FREE-WILL; RESPONSIBILITY; LIBERTARIANISM; CAUSATION;
D O I
10.1007/s10670-021-00479-6
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
If indeterminism is to be necessary for moral responsibility, we must show that it doesn't preclude responsibility (the Luck Problem) and that it might enhance it (the Enhancement Problem). A 'strong luck claim' motivates the Luck Problem: if an agent's choice is undetermined, then her mental life will be causally irrelevant to her choice, whichever way she decides. A 'weak luck claim' motivates the Enhancement Problem: if an agent's choice is undetermined, then even if her mental life is causally relevant to her choice, whichever way she decides, we cannot explain how she settles her choice. Only the weak luck claim is plausible. However, its plausibility depends on our accepting that we could only settle our choices if they are settled by additional exercises of agency. If we instead understand the process of settling decisions in procedural terms, we can begin to sketch a solution to the Enhancement Problem.
引用
收藏
页码:2827 / 2846
页数:20
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