compensation structure;
corporate innovation;
information asymmetry;
venture capital investment;
RESEARCH-AND-DEVELOPMENT;
ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE;
INFORMATION ASYMMETRY;
PRIVATE EQUITY;
PUBLIC-POLICY;
FUNDING GAPS;
PERFORMANCE;
GROWTH;
MARKET;
FIRMS;
D O I:
10.1111/jbfa.12618
中图分类号:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
摘要:
We examine whether venture capital (VC) investment enhances corporate innovation in Korea. Using a matched sample of 802 firms from 1998 to 2012, we find that after the first round of VC investment, VC-backed firms are more innovative than non-VC-backed firms. Our results suggest that the positive influence of VC investment largely comes from the ability of VC firms to reduce information asymmetry between investors and ventures: VC funds managed by independent venture capitalists significantly enhance corporate innovation, whereas those managed by governmental venture capitalists do not. Furthermore, this positive influence becomes more pronounced where there is greater information asymmetry. Finally, we show that funds with profit-based compensation structures are more likely to encourage corporate innovation than those with fee-based compensation structures.
机构:
M.J. Neeley School of Business, Texas Christian University, TCU Box 298530, Fort WorthDepartment of Management, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, N.T.
Bruton G.D.
;
Yeh K.S.
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Department of Business Management, National Sun Yat-Sen University, KaohsiungDepartment of Management, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, N.T.
机构:
M.J. Neeley School of Business, Texas Christian University, TCU Box 298530, Fort WorthDepartment of Management, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, N.T.
Bruton G.D.
;
Yeh K.S.
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Department of Business Management, National Sun Yat-Sen University, KaohsiungDepartment of Management, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, N.T.