Gather or Scatter: Stackelberg-Game-Based Task Decision for Blockchain-Assisted Socially Aware Crowdsensing Framework

被引:9
|
作者
Huang, Sijie [1 ]
Gao, Guoju [1 ]
Huang, He [1 ]
Sun, Yu-E [2 ]
Du, Yang [1 ]
Xiao, Mingjun [3 ]
Wu, Jie [4 ]
Wang, Yihuai [1 ]
机构
[1] Soochow Univ, Sch Comp Sci & Technol, Suzhou 215006, Peoples R China
[2] Soochow Univ, Sch Rail Transportat, Suzhou 215006, Peoples R China
[3] Univ Sci & Technol China, Suzhou Inst Adv Study, Sch Comp Sci & Technol, Hefei, Peoples R China
[4] Temple Univ, Dept Comp & Informat Sci, Philadelphia 19122, PA USA
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Blockchain-based crowdsensing; game theory; information corroboration; privacy preservation; social effects; INCENTIVE MECHANISM; MOBILE; NETWORKS; PRIVACY;
D O I
10.1109/JIOT.2023.3284477
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
Mobile crowdsensing (MC), an excellent solution to large-scale spatiotemporal data sensing problems, has recently received lots of attention from both industry and academia. In the MC system, any requester can acquire the sensing data for his points of interest (PoIs) by offering some payments to attract a group of mobile users capable of completing these PoI-related sensing tasks. However, the current MC work neglected three vital factors, more or less. First, they assume that these distributed users are mutually independent in MC, ignoring the social effects. Actually, the sensing data collected by one user may be corroborated by others' sensing data, so-called information corroboration. Second, all rational and selfish users are inclined to gather to perform these tasks due to information corroboration. Meanwhile, they may be strategic about their participation levels to maximize profits. However, more similar sensing data will undoubtedly lower the information value, so any user has a tradeoff between gather and scatter. Third, although mobile users can obtain some payments, privacy issues may still prevent them from participating in MC. In this article, we propose a secure blockchain-assisted socially-aware MC framework by adopting the smart contract technique of Ethereum. For this framework, we further devise a two-stage Stackelberg game model to assist the requester (i.e., the leader in the game) in properly pricing each PoI-related sensing task, so that mobile users (i.e., the followers in the game) can exactly select their tasks and determine their participation levels. To analyze the game equilibrium, we extend the traditional Hessian matrix method to a multidimension case involving the multiuser multitask hyperspace setting. We conduct extensive experiments to prove the equilibrium and effectiveness of the proposed solution. We also implement a prototype and deploy the smart contract to an official Ethereum test network to demonstrate the practicability of the proposed framework.
引用
收藏
页码:1939 / 1951
页数:13
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