Not satisfactory, but still acceptable: Exploring socioeconomic incentives of individual quota systems in Japanese Pacific bluefin tuna fisheries from the management leaders' perspective

The individual quota (IQ) system is a rights-based management system that has been implemented in many countries, despite its lack of quota transferability. The purpose of this study was to explore the incentives behind the introduction of a non-transferable IQ system from the management leaders' perspective through comparative case study of three Japanese Pacific bluefin tuna (Thunnus orientalis) fisheries with different community units. In 2019-2020, process tracing was conducted through semi-structured interviews with fisheries management staff, prefectural governments, and fishing cooperative associations who play an important role in introducing the IQ system in each community. In each case, in order to set allocations and to manage catch quotas, local fishers could participate in the council or by attending meetings. With a high priority for complying with the defined PBF catch quotas, the IQ system was finally introduced, either as a standalone system or combined with other management methods. While the non-transferable IQ systems in the case studies were not necessarily selected as satisfactory, but still considered acceptable, our data suggests that socioeconomic incentives, including revenue improvement and ensuring equity, were important. These incentives were not triggered by the system per se, but were due to a well-functioning co-management system. Recently, there has been a shift from voluntary IQ systems to government-led ones based on the revised Fisheries Act. Future trends should continue to be moni-tored, as government-led systems have stricter rules that may hamper the socioeconomic incentives described above.