Trust but verify: Satellite reconnaissance, secrecy and arms control during the Cold War
被引:7
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作者:
Bateman, Aaron
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机构:
George Washington Univ, Elliott Sch Int Affairs, 1957 E St NW, Washington, DC 20052 USAGeorge Washington Univ, Elliott Sch Int Affairs, 1957 E St NW, Washington, DC 20052 USA
Bateman, Aaron
[1
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机构:
[1] George Washington Univ, Elliott Sch Int Affairs, 1957 E St NW, Washington, DC 20052 USA
During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union implemented multiple arms control treaties that depended on National Technical Means (NTM) for verification. Since NTM included covert satellite reconnaissance systems that gathered a sizeable portion of American intelligence on the USSR, the US government kept the details about its NTM ambiguous. Consequently, US diplomats had to negotiate a verification framework dependant on NTM without compromising sensitive space-based intelligence capabilities. This article uses newly declassified documents to explore how Washington and Moscow navigated the boundaries of secrecy concerning space reconnaissance to create a robust arms control verification regime.
机构:
Univ Calif Washington, UC Inst Global Conflict & Cooperat IGCC, Technol & Int Secur, Washington, DC USAUniv Calif Washington, UC Inst Global Conflict & Cooperat IGCC, Technol & Int Secur, Washington, DC USA
机构:
James Martin Ctr Nonproliferat Studies, Eurasia Nonproliferat Program, Monterey, CA 93940 USAJames Martin Ctr Nonproliferat Studies, Eurasia Nonproliferat Program, Monterey, CA 93940 USA