When should a retailer with competing manufacturers reveal product fit information?

被引:10
作者
Sun, Liyuan [1 ]
Chen, Bintong [2 ]
Chen, Jing [3 ]
Yang, Hui [1 ]
机构
[1] Nanjing Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Econ & Management, Nanjing, Peoples R China
[2] Univ Delaware, Lerner Coll Business & Econ, Newark, DE USA
[3] Dalhousie Univ, Rowe Sch Business, Halifax, NS, Canada
基金
加拿大自然科学与工程研究理事会; 中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Supply chain management; game theory; fit information disclosure strategy; pricing; Hoteling model; CHANNEL STRUCTURE; SUPPLY CHAIN; DISCLOSURE; REVIEWS; IMPACT; REVELATION; STRATEGIES; SEARCH; NEWS;
D O I
10.1080/00207543.2022.2044536
中图分类号
T [工业技术];
学科分类号
08 ;
摘要
We investigate whether and when a retailer who sells two quality differentiated products supplied by two manufacturers should reveal product fit information to help consumers find a product that better fits their needs. We show that the retailer's optimal information strategy depends on the consumer's unit misfit cost and production efficiencies of both manufacturers. The retailer should reveal product fit information when the ratio of the efficiencies of the two manufacturers is sufficiently low, or the consumer's unit misfit cost is sufficiently high. The retailer is less likely to benefit from revealing product fit information when the consumer's unit misfit cost is either low or very high. Two mechanisms, margin-enhancing (driving the efficient manufacturer to reduce the wholesale price) and market-targeting (setting higher retail prices for both products), that the retailer can benefit from revealing product fit information are discussed, and the associated conditions are identified. Our findings suggest that the inefficient manufacturer is always better off when the retailer reveals fit information, but the efficient manufacturer may suffer. A win-win-win for all supply chain members can be achieved under certain conditions.
引用
收藏
页码:1664 / 1682
页数:19
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