How to achieve carbon abatement in aviation with hybrid mechanism? A stochastic evolutionary game model

被引:6
作者
Zhang, Peiwen [1 ]
Ding, Rui [2 ]
机构
[1] Civil Aviat Flight Univ China, Sch Econ & Management, Guanghan 618307, Peoples R China
[2] Civil Aviat Flight Univ China, Sch Airport, Guanghan 618307, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Aviation carbon emissions; Hybrid mechanism; Stochastic evolutionary game; Carbon emission reduction; EMISSIONS; CHINA; TAX; IMPACT;
D O I
10.1016/j.energy.2023.129349
中图分类号
O414.1 [热力学];
学科分类号
摘要
Aviation carbon emissions are growing as the volume of aviation traffic continues to increase, both exacerbating global greenhouse gas emissions and increasing the resistance to green aviation development. To effectively promote aviation carbon abatement, this paper, based on the hybrid mechanism composed of carbon trading and taxation, a tripartite Ito<SIC> stochastic evolutionary game model is first constructed. The complex game interactions among the administration, major airlines, and minor airlines are analyzed. Second, we use Gaussian white noise as the ambient uncertainty and apply stochastic Taylor expansion to find the numerical approximation solution. Finally, through numerical simulations, the decision-making behavior of stakeholders and their sensitivity to key influencing factors are illustrated. The study shows that different variables have differential effects on stakeholders' strategic choices in terms of convergence speed, change speed, and stability. Starting from three different regulatory paths, this study provides insights into the priority and direction of adjusting relevant variables, thereby offering guidance for policymakers and managers in effectively regulating aviation carbon abatement.
引用
收藏
页数:15
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