Judicial Law-Making in the Criminal Decisions of the Polish Supreme Court and the German Federal Court of Justice: A Comparative View

被引:1
作者
Malolepszy, Maciej [1 ,2 ]
Gluchowski, Michal [1 ]
机构
[1] European Univ Viadrina Frankfurt Oder, Fac Law, Frankfurt, Germany
[2] Univ Zielona Gora, Fac Law & Adm, Zielona Gora, Poland
来源
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR THE SEMIOTICS OF LAW-REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE SEMIOTIQUE JURIDIQUE | 2023年 / 36卷 / 03期
关键词
Judicial law-making; Comparative law; Legal interpretation; Polish criminal law; German criminal law; Judicature;
D O I
10.1007/s11196-023-09969-y
中图分类号
D9 [法律]; DF [法律];
学科分类号
0301 ;
摘要
This paper investigates the phenomenon of judicial law-making in the practice of the highest courts dealing with criminal matters in Germany and Poland on the basis of 200 of their decisions. While German jurisprudence principally acknowledges the right of the judiciary to create new law, the Polish legal theory generally rejects this notion. Still, research indicates that, in practice, the differences in the frequency and intensity with which these courts pass creative rulings are not as substantial as the discrepancy in the theoretical stance would suggest. Owing to circumstances, both the German Federal Court of Justice and the Polish Supreme Court are willing to create new legal norms, but the dimensions of judicial law-making presented by these bodies deviate from each other. In the research sample, the German Federal Court of Justice was more inclined to introduce legal institutions that were foreign to the statutes and rule against the will of the lawmaker explicitly stated in the preparatory works. On the other hand, the Polish Supreme Court used logical conclusions more often, but did not also refrain from passing rulings against the clear wording of the statutory law, and was just as willing to go beyond the wording of the law as was the German Federal Court of Justice. Notably, only the German apex court is willing to openly admit that it creates new legal norms, whereas the Polish Supreme Court does not concede in the reasons that its decisions are of a law-making nature, especially when it applies so-called "interpretation in the wider sense"-which is, in essence, a "concealed" way of creating new legal norms.
引用
收藏
页码:1147 / 1184
页数:38
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