Corporate governance and systemic risk: Evidence from Chinese-listed banks

被引：8

作者：

Lee, Chien-Chiang ^{[1
]}

Wang, Yurong ^{[2
]}

Zhang, Xiaoming ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Nanchang Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Nanchang, Peoples R China

[2] Beijing Jiaotong Univ, Dept Finance, Beijing, Peoples R China

来源：

INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF ECONOMICS & FINANCE | 2023年 / 87卷

关键词：

Bank systemic risk; Corporate governance; Bank risk-taking; Financial stability; China; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; BOARD COMPOSITION; INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS; PRICE INFORMATIVENESS; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; STAKEHOLDER THEORY; FIRM PERFORMANCE; STATE OWNERSHIP; WOMEN DIRECTORS; INVESTMENT;

D O I：

10.1016/j.iref.2023.04.023

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

This research empirically examines the influence of internal and external governance on bank systemic risk. Employing data of listed banks in China during 2007-2020, the results show that the factors of a strong board, salary compensation, and ownership governance contribute to mitigating systemic risk. Different from U.S. banks and European markets, institutional investors play a monitoring role in containing excessive bank risk-taking. Our findings further indicate internal governance complements external governance at improving financial stability and offer implications that banks should improve the effectiveness of internal governance and governments should actively encourage institutional investors to engage in corporate governance.

引用

页码：180 / 202

页数：23

共 158 条

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