Government-Opposition Relations and the Vote of No-Confidence

被引:8
作者
Tuttnauer, Or [1 ,3 ]
Hazan, Reuven Y. [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Mannheim, Mannheimer Zentrum Europa Sozialforschung MZES, Mannheim, Germany
[2] Hebrew Univ Jerusalem, Dept Polit Sci, Jerusalem, Israel
[3] Univ Mannheim, Mannheimer Zentrum Europa Sozialforschung MZES, D-68131 Mannheim, Germany
基金
以色列科学基金会;
关键词
government; opposition; no-confidence; parliament; conflict; PARLIAMENTARY OPPOSITION; BEHAVIOR; DETERMINANTS; AGENDA;
D O I
10.1177/00323217231168765
中图分类号
D81 [国际关系];
学科分类号
030207 ;
摘要
The vote of no-confidence is the primary mechanism through which the principle of government accountability to the legislature - the defining feature of parliamentary democracy - is achieved. Yet, no research has been devoted to its influence on the relations between the government and the mechanism's main users - the opposition. This article attempts to fill this lacuna by theorising how restrictiveness in the vote of no-confidence influences the opposition's strategies vis-a-vis the government in legislative voting. We delineate the influence of the vote of no-confidence on the opposition via its preference to pursue more cooperative strategies, as opposed to conflictual ones, distinguishing between the two stages of the vote of no-confidence - initiating and voting. We empirically explore the relation between the vote of no-confidence and the voting behaviour of 59 opposition parties in 16 countries, showing that greater restrictions on both stages of the vote of no-confidence correlate with less conflictual opposition behaviour.
引用
收藏
页码:984 / 1004
页数:21
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