Electoral cycles and public spending during the pandemic

被引:1
作者
Lokshin, Michael [1 ]
Rodriguez-Ferrari, Aylen [1 ]
Torre, Ivan [1 ]
机构
[1] World Bank, Washington, DC 20433 USA
关键词
electoral cycle; governance; pandemic; social protection; POLITICAL BUDGET CYCLES; TRANSFERS EVIDENCE; DEMOCRACY; ELECTIONS; POLICY;
D O I
10.1111/rode.13094
中图分类号
F0 [经济学]; F1 [世界各国经济概况、经济史、经济地理]; C [社会科学总论];
学科分类号
0201 ; 020105 ; 03 ; 0303 ;
摘要
This paper uses a newly assembled dataset on various types of social protection spending in 154 countries during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and 2021 to analyze the effect of the electoral cycle on the size and composition of the social protection stimulus budget. The analysis shows that the longer the time since the last election in a country-and thus the sooner the next election date-the larger the share of the social protection pandemic budget allocated to social assistance and income protection, and the lower the share allocated to job retention schemes. The electoral cycle appears to have impacted the size of social assistance spending only in countries with high political competition.
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页码:1077 / 1107
页数:31
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