Tripartite evolutionary game analysis and simulation research on zero-carbon production supervision of marine ranching against a carbon-neutral background

被引:9
作者
Liang, Jinshui [1 ]
Zhang, Maomao [2 ]
Yin, Zengqiang [1 ]
Niu, Keru [3 ]
Li, Yuan [1 ]
Zhi, Kaiting [3 ]
Huang, Shengnan [1 ]
Yang, Jun [1 ]
Xu, Min [4 ]
机构
[1] Dalian Ocean Univ, Coll Marine Technol & Environm, Dalian, Peoples R China
[2] Huazhong Univ Sci & Technol, Coll Publ Adm, Wuhan, Peoples R China
[3] Dalian Ocean Univ, Coll Fisheries & Life Sci, Dalian, Peoples R China
[4] Chinese Acad Fishery Sci, East China Sea Fisheries Res Inst, Shanghai, Peoples R China
来源
FRONTIERS IN ECOLOGY AND EVOLUTION | 2023年 / 11卷
基金
国家重点研发计划;
关键词
marine ranching; zero carbon; marine carbon sink; third-party testing facility; government supervision; tripartite evolutionary game; STRATEGIES; CHINA; CERTIFICATION; TECHNOLOGY; STABILITY; POLICIES;
D O I
10.3389/fevo.2023.1119048
中图分类号
Q14 [生态学(生物生态学)];
学科分类号
071012 ; 0713 ;
摘要
Introduction: Theoretically and practically, studying the zero-carbon production supervision of marine ranching is crucial to the attainment of my country's fishery carbon peak and carbon neutral goals. Methods: This study introduces a third-party detection agency to construct a tripartite evolutionary game model based on the possibility of problems such as a lack of government supervision and imperfect detection mechanisms, through an analysis of the evolution stability and evolution path of each participant's strategy choice, the mechanism of each element's influence on the tripartite strategy choice is revealed, as well as the evolution law of the tripartite game. Results: (1) The change in strategic choice of each participant is significantly influenced by the change in strategic choice of the other participants, and the comprehensive consideration of the maximization of the comprehensive value of each participant is conducive to the development of all three parties. (2) Government efforts to increase low-carbon subsidies and penalties will aid in promoting the normative behavior of zero-carbon production by marine ranching businesses and the rejection of rent-seeking by third parties. (3)The accountability of higher-level governments for the dereliction of duty of regulatory agencies is particularly important to enhance the robustness of zero-carbon production of marine ranching enterprises. Discussion: In this study, the ideal state of carbon balance of Marine ranching enterprises is taken as the condition to establish a tripartite evolutionary game, and the numerical simulation analysis results based on the model's evolutionary stable equilibrium put forward countermeasures and suggestions for the government to improve the supervision mechanism of zero-carbon production of Marine ranching. In order to provide reference for the development of the marine ranching industry and promote the realization of zero emissions in the production activities of the marine ranching industry.
引用
收藏
页数:12
相关论文
共 54 条
  • [1] [Anonymous], 2022, COMMUNICATION
  • [2] DOES NEUTRAL STABILITY IMPLY LYAPUNOV STABILITY
    BOMZE, IM
    WEIBULL, JW
    [J]. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 1995, 11 (02) : 173 - 192
  • [3] Concerns about illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, carbon footprint, and the impact of fuel subsidy-An economic analysis of the Black Sea anchovy fishery
    Dagtekin, Murat
    Guecue, Ali Cemal
    Genc, Yasar
    [J]. MARINE POLICY, 2022, 140
  • [4] Tripartite supervision mechanism and evolutionary strategies for marine ranching ecological security: Policy tools perspective
    Du, Yuan-Wei
    Sun, Hao-Ran
    Wan, Xiao-Le
    [J]. REGIONAL STUDIES IN MARINE SCIENCE, 2022, 50
  • [5] EVOLUTIONARY GAMES IN ECONOMICS
    FRIEDMAN, D
    [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1991, 59 (03) : 637 - 666
  • [6] Population, technology, and growth: From Malthusian stagnation to the demographic transition and beyond
    Galor, O
    Weil, DN
    [J]. AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2000, 90 (04) : 806 - 828
  • [7] Government Low-Carbon Policies Optimization for Smart Transportation Enterprises
    Gao, Kai
    Guo, Xin
    Liu, Tingting
    Han, Rui
    [J]. DISCRETE DYNAMICS IN NATURE AND SOCIETY, 2022, 2022
  • [8] An evolutionary game study of environmental regulation strategies for marine ecological governance in China
    Gao, Lehua
    Yan, An
    Yin, Qiaorong
    [J]. FRONTIERS IN MARINE SCIENCE, 2022, 9
  • [9] Research and analysis of environmental legal compensation mechanisms related to waste incineration in the context of "double carbon"
    Gao, Yuanfei
    Gao, Ruosu
    [J]. FRONTIERS IN ECOLOGY AND EVOLUTION, 2022, 10
  • [10] Certifications in short food supply chains in the region of Madrid. Part of the alternative?
    Gonzalez-Azcarate, Mario
    Cruz-Macein, Jose Luis
    Bardaji, Isabel
    [J]. ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS, 2022, 195