Game analysis of incremental income allocation in the marketization of rural collectively-owned commercial construction land under fairness preference

被引:9
作者
Zou, Yucheng [1 ]
Yan, Lei [2 ]
Zhang, Yanwei [3 ]
机构
[1] Zhejiang Univ, Sch Publ Affairs, Hangzhou 310058, Peoples R China
[2] Cent South Univ, Sch Business, Changsha 410083, Peoples R China
[3] Huazhong Univ Sci & Technol, Coll Publ Adm, Wuhan 430074, Peoples R China
关键词
Rural collectively -owned commercial con; struction land (RCOCCL); Marketization; Fairness preference; Income allocation; China; CHINA; RIGHTS; CONSOLIDATION; COMPENSATION; POLICY;
D O I
10.1016/j.strueco.2023.02.001
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This study explains how fairness preferences affect the allocation of income based on the practices of rural collectively-owned commercial construction land (RCOCCL) entering the market in contemporary China. The theoretical model for RCOCCL's market income allocation is extended based on Fehr and Schmidt (1999), and a fairness preference model is developed for analysis. The study makes the following conclusions. First, the stakeholders are bounded rational people with fair preferences, making them eager to narrow the income gap between themselves and others. Second, the income to local governments should be increased. Third, the more willing farmers accept the allocation scheme, the higher the benefits. Overall, this study provides new per-spectives on the fair allocation of income and references for subsequent research on rural land income allocation in other developing countries.
引用
收藏
页码:1 / 14
页数:14
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