Mandatory auditor rotation and audit quality

被引:1
作者
Dayanandan, Ajit [1 ]
Kuntluru, Sudershan [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Alaska Anchorage, Coll Business & Publ Policy, Anchorage, AK 99508 USA
[2] Indian Inst Management Kozhikode, Dept Accounting & Finance, Kozhikode, India
关键词
India; Auditor tenure; Audit quality; Mandatory auditor rotation; Concentrated ownership; Modified audit opinion; MARKET PERCEPTION EVIDENCE; PARTNER ROTATION; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; FIRM ROTATION; TENURE; OWNERSHIP; BOARD; FEES;
D O I
10.1108/IJAIM-02-2023-0049
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
PurposeIn the post-Enron era around the world, the role of auditor is widely debated. There is an increasing concern that an auditor's continuous involvement with clients could impair audit quality - the negative view. There is also a positive view that a long auditor tenure leads to accumulation of client-specific knowledge over time, which could lead to high-quality audits. The empirical result with regards to impact of mandatory auditor rotation (MAR) is mixed world-wide. This study aims to examine whether MAR rules implemented in 2017 impact audit quality in India. Design/methodology/approachUsing a unique setting in which MAR was required from 2017 to 2018 onwards in India, this study provides empirical evidence of the impact of MAR regulation on audit quality (modified audit opinion). The study uses data for 714 firms (4,284 firms) for six years (three years before MAR and three years after MAR regulation in India). FindingsThe study found that auditor tenure and MAR had significant negative impacts on audit quality, validating the "positive" view of audit tenure and audit quality. In addition, concentrated ownership had a negative impact on audit quality, implying the control and influence by concentrated ownership on auditors and audit opinion. The analysis shows that MAR regulation has not yielded the intended objective of improving audit quality in India. MAR is not a good template for improving audit quality. Research limitations/implicationsThe findings of the study are useful to policymakers, regulators, managers, investors and users of financial reports. The study calls for public policy on auditor rotation based on objective scientific evidence. In light of the evidence in India that MAR does not lead to better audit quality, the study calls for reset of regulatory policy in India. Practical implicationsThe study provides valuable insights to analysts, regulators and other users of financial accounts about the implications of MAR in India. Originality/valueThe study is one of the few to report on the impact of MAR, particularly in the context of an emerging market economy such as India.
引用
收藏
页码:585 / 599
页数:15
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