The winner-take-all dilemma

被引:1
作者
Kikuchi, Kazuya [1 ]
Koriyama, Yukio [2 ]
机构
[1] Tokyo Univ Foreign Studies, World Language & Soc Educ Ctr, Tokyo, Japan
[2] Inst Polytech Paris, Ecole Polytech, Dept Econ, CREST, Paris, France
关键词
Representative democracy; winner-take-all rule; proportional rule; prisoner's dilemma; C72; D70; D72; ELECTORAL-COLLEGE; WEIGHTS; POWER;
D O I
10.3982/TE5248
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We consider collective decision-making when society consists of groups endowed with voting weights. Each group chooses an internal rule that specifies the allocation of its weight to alternatives as a function of its members' preferences. Under fairly general conditions, we show that the winner-take-all rule is a dominant strategy, while the equilibrium is Pareto dominated, highlighting the dilemma structure between optimality for each group and for the whole society. We also develop a technique for asymptotic analysis and show Pareto dominance of the proportional rule.
引用
收藏
页码:917 / 940
页数:24
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