The impact of clawback provisions on executive cash compensation

被引:1
作者
Liu, Hanni [1 ]
Liu, Harrison [2 ]
Yin, Jennifer [2 ]
机构
[1] Manhattan Coll, OMalley Sch Business, 4513 Manhattan Coll Pkwy, New York, NY 10471 USA
[2] Univ Texas San Antonio, Dept Accounting, 1 UTSA Circle, San Antonio, TX 78258 USA
关键词
Clawback; Ex post settling up; Performance measures; Executive compensation; ASYMMETRIC SENSITIVITY; FIRM; EARNINGS; COSTS;
D O I
10.1007/s11156-023-01136-5
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
An asymmetric payoff function exists in CEO compensation: the sensitivity between CEO cash compensation and negative stock returns is higher than that to positive stock returns. The underlying rationale for such an asymmetrical relationship is that the difficulty of the ex post settling up of cash compensation prompts boards to reduce compensation when there is bad news. In this paper, we examine firms that adopt clawback provisions and find no evidence of such an asymmetry in these firms. The finding is consistent with the clawback provision's ex post settling up characteristics. Our paper contributes to the literature by showing that clawback provisions favorably impact the structure of CEO compensation by reducing agency costs related to the ex post settling up problem.
引用
收藏
页码:35 / 62
页数:28
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