An apologia for using journal prestige in academic employment decisions: An asymmetric information perspective

Using journal prestige to gauge the quality of research articles has been criticized by some scholars in the academic research assessment literature. These critics argue that citation-based metrics, while imperfect, are better suited to assessing article quality. This paper counters these beliefs by describing specific research assessment contexts where journal prestige is likely to be the superior mode of assessment. To do so, academic employment decisions are framed as asymmetric information problems wherein the research evaluating body has less information about a scholar's true abilities than the scholar. Signaling Theory therefore offers a logical explanation for using journal prestige as a measure of research quality during academic contract renewals and promotions wherein recent research accomplishments are of preeminent importance. While journal prestige is an imperfect measure of article quality (as are citation counts), understanding it as a credible signal in an asymmetric information environment proffers a fundamental explanation for its applicability in academic assessment decisions.