The dynamics of CEO equity vs. inside debt and firm performance

被引：0
作者：
Pollock, Susan [1 ]
Switzer, Lorne N. [1 ]
Wang, Jun [2 ]
机构：
[1] Concordia Univ, John Molson Sch Business, Dept Finance, Montreal, PQ, Canada
[2] Univ Manitoba, IH Asper Sch Business, Dept Accounting & Finance, Winnipeg, MB, Canada
来源：
RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND FINANCE | 2023年 / 64卷
关键词：
CEO compensation; Optimal capital structure; Agency costs; Employment horizon; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; DUALITY; PAY; INCENTIVES; OWNERSHIP; HORIZON; RISK;
D O I：
10.1016/j.ribaf.2023.101891
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
This paper provides new evidence on the comparative dynamic effects of CEO inside debt and equity compensation on firm performance as measured by Tobin's Q. In contrast to the extant literature, we find significant empirical evidence supporting the classic Jensen and Meckling (1976) premise that managers should receive debt vs. equity compensation in proportion to the capital structure of the firm. We also provide new evidence showing that the effects of the CEO compensation structure on firm performance are dependent on the CEO's time horizon, as measured by the expected period of employment to retirement. We show that the incremental benefits of equity compensation to performance increase with the CEO's projected time to retirement. A similar, but insignificant relationship is observed for CEO inside debt compensation. Cash compensation is more beneficial to the firm when concentrated near the end of the CEO's tenure.
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页数：13
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