NETWORK PHYSICAL LAYER ATTACK IN THE VERY HIGH CAPACITY NETWORKS

This paper focuses on the analysis of fiber optic line eavesdropping options based on cheap and easy-to-use equipment -for example, the commonly used fiber optic splitters with suitable optical power division ratios. The fiber optic splitter takes a small portion of the optical power sufficient for the eavesdropper to read the data and lets as much signal power as possible pass in the original direction. We attempted to detect the presence of fiber optic splitter-based eavesdropping points on the communication line by using common techniques designated for fiber optic quality measurement and fault detection. The results are summarised in this paper.year billions of dollars are lost due to intrusions into those same networks. At first, fiber optic networks were touted as one of the most secure infrastructure options. In the last couple of years, it has been suggested that fiber is almost as easy to tap as copper [1] and [2]. Today, there are millions of miles of fiber cable spanning the globe. Large amount of data are being transmitted across these cables daily, including sensitive government data, and personal financial, and medical information. Fiber optic communication is widely and publicly understood as a medium that is difficult to eavesdrop on. Unfortunately, this common conception is far from the technical reality. In this paper, we study some cheap and easily accessible tools for eavesdropping on fiber optic communications and explore the chances for the automatic detection of their placement on live fiber optic lines.