共 54 条
Toward efficient waste electric vehicle battery recycling via auction-based market trading mechanisms
被引:19
作者:
Xu, Su Xiu
[1
]
Feng, Jianghong
[2
,7
]
Huang, George Q.
[3
]
Zhai, Yue
[4
,5
]
Cheng, Meng
[6
]
机构:
[1] Beijing Inst Technol, Sch Management & Econ, Beijing, Peoples R China
[2] Jinan Univ, Sch Management, Guangzhou, Peoples R China
[3] Hong Kong Polytech Univ, Dept Ind & Syst Engn, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[4] Beijing Jiaotong Univ, Sch Economicsand Management, Dept Logist Management, Beijing, Peoples R China
[5] Beijing Jiaotong Univ, Res Ctr Cent & Eastern Europe, Beijing, Peoples R China
[6] Shenzhen Polytech, Sch Management, Shenzhen, Peoples R China
[7] Jinan Univ, Sch Management, Guangzhou 510632, Peoples R China
基金:
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词:
Double auction;
electric vehicle battery recycling;
mechanism design;
incentive compatibility;
market trade mechanism;
PROCUREMENT;
ALLOCATION;
LOGISTICS;
DESIGN;
POLICY;
D O I:
10.1080/00207543.2022.2157904
中图分类号:
T [工业技术];
学科分类号:
08 ;
摘要:
This paper proposes an auction-based market trade mechanism for the electric vehicle battery recycling (EVBR) problem, which aims to realise the optimal resource allocation and pricing of EVBR. The main motivation of this paper is to attempt to explore an approach to achieving efficient battery recycling. We first consider an EVBR market with m buyers and n sellers, and develop the multi-unit trade reduction (MTR) mechanism in the EVBR market. According to the supply and demand relationship in the EVBR market, we consider three market scenarios of supply and demand balance, oversupply, and overdemand, and formulated corresponding auction allocation rules. Numerical study results show that the proposed MTR mechanism can achieve efficient resource allocation. We also observed that not all results increased with the number of sellers/buyers. Second, considering the distance between sellers and buyers, we developed a stochastic multiple MTR (SM-MTR) mechanism to enable sellers and buyers within the region to conduct transactions. Finally, we propose an integrated MTR, SM-MTR and one-sided Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction mechanism that is feasible in both one-sided and bilateral environments. Furthermore, our work can provide novel managerial implications for EVBR market stakeholders in terms of practical application.
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页码:8598 / 8617
页数:20
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