Actions speak louder than words: Environmental law enforcement externalities and access to bank loans

被引:30
作者
Wu, Xiting [1 ]
Luo, Le [2 ]
You, Jiaxing [3 ]
机构
[1] Shandong Univ, Sch Management, Jinan 250100, Peoples R China
[2] Macquarie Univ, Macquarie Business Sch, 4 Eastern Rd, Macquarie Pk, NSW 2109, Australia
[3] Xiamen Univ, Sch Management, Xiamen 361005, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Environmental enforcement; Bank loan; Environmental risk; China; CORPORATE SOCIAL-RESPONSIBILITY; REGULATORY COSTS; PERFORMANCE; INFORMATION; MANAGEMENT; QUALITY; CONTRACTS; ACCRUALS; EARNINGS; CREDIT;
D O I
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2023.106882
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
By exploiting the staggered city-level establishment of specialized environmental courts in China as exogenous shocks and using a difference-in-differences research design, we find that an increase in the efficiency of environmental enforcement leads to a decrease in companies' access to bank loans. The channel tests show that these same shocks lead to an increase in environmental litigation, op-erational and reputational risk. The cross-sectional analyses also reveal consistent evidence. Collec-tively, our findings suggest that the environmental mandate has important externalities for bank lend-ing decisions, indicating that the costs of environmental enforcement go beyond reducing environmental pollution. (c) 2023 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页数:29
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