Actions speak louder than words: Environmental law enforcement externalities and access to bank loans

被引:25
作者
Wu, Xiting [1 ]
Luo, Le [2 ]
You, Jiaxing [3 ]
机构
[1] Shandong Univ, Sch Management, Jinan 250100, Peoples R China
[2] Macquarie Univ, Macquarie Business Sch, 4 Eastern Rd, Macquarie Pk, NSW 2109, Australia
[3] Xiamen Univ, Sch Management, Xiamen 361005, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Environmental enforcement; Bank loan; Environmental risk; China; CORPORATE SOCIAL-RESPONSIBILITY; REGULATORY COSTS; PERFORMANCE; INFORMATION; MANAGEMENT; QUALITY; CONTRACTS; ACCRUALS; EARNINGS; CREDIT;
D O I
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2023.106882
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
By exploiting the staggered city-level establishment of specialized environmental courts in China as exogenous shocks and using a difference-in-differences research design, we find that an increase in the efficiency of environmental enforcement leads to a decrease in companies' access to bank loans. The channel tests show that these same shocks lead to an increase in environmental litigation, op-erational and reputational risk. The cross-sectional analyses also reveal consistent evidence. Collec-tively, our findings suggest that the environmental mandate has important externalities for bank lend-ing decisions, indicating that the costs of environmental enforcement go beyond reducing environmental pollution. (c) 2023 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页数:29
相关论文
共 83 条
  • [1] Creditor Rights, Enforcement, and Bank Loans
    Bae, Kee-Hong
    Goyal, Vidhan K.
    [J]. JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2009, 64 (02) : 823 - 860
  • [2] How much should we trust staggered difference-in-differences estimates? *
    Baker, Andrew C.
    Larcker, David F.
    Wang, Charles C. Y.
    [J]. JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2022, 144 (02) : 370 - 395
  • [3] ESTIMATION AND MARKET VALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITIES RELATING TO SUPERFUND SITES
    BARTH, ME
    MCNICHOLS, MF
    [J]. JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, 1994, 32 : 177 - 209
  • [4] The importance of accounting changes in debt contracts: the cost of flexibility in covenant calculations
    Beatty, A
    Ramesh, K
    Weber, J
    [J]. JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 2002, 33 (02) : 205 - 227
  • [5] Why do borrowers pledge collateral? New empirical evidence on the role of asymmetric information
    Berger, Allen N.
    Espinosa-Vega, Marco A.
    Frame, W. Scott
    Miller, Nathan H.
    [J]. JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION, 2011, 20 (01) : 55 - 70
  • [6] Enjoying the quiet life? Corporate governance and managerial preferences
    Bertrand, M
    Mullainathan, S
    [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 2003, 111 (05) : 1043 - 1075
  • [7] Accounting quality and debt contracting
    Bharath, Sreedhar T.
    Sunder, Jayanthi
    Sunder, Shyam V.
    [J]. ACCOUNTING REVIEW, 2008, 83 (01) : 1 - 28
  • [8] Blacconiere WalterG., 1997, J ACCOUNT AUDIT FINA, V12, P149, DOI DOI 10.1177/0148558X9701200203
  • [9] ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURES, REGULATORY COSTS, AND CHANGES IN FIRM VALUE
    BLACCONIERE, WG
    PATTEN, DM
    [J]. JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 1994, 18 (03) : 357 - 377
  • [10] Capital structures in developing countries
    Booth, L
    Aivazian, V
    Demirguc-Kunt, A
    Maksimovic, V
    [J]. JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2001, 56 (01) : 87 - 130