Multimarket Contact in Health Insurance: Evidence from Medicare Advantage

被引：5

作者：

Lin, Haizhen ^{[1
,2
]}

McCarthy, Ian M. ^{[3
,4
]}

机构：

[1] Indiana Univ, Kelley Sch Business, Business Econ & Publ Policy, 1309 E Tenth St, Bloomington, IN 47405 USA

[2] NBER, Kelley Sch Business, Business Econ & Publ Policy, 1309 Tenth St, Bloomington, IN 47405 USA

[3] Emory Univ, Dept Econ, 1602 Fishburne Dr, Atlanta, GA 30322 USA

[4] NBER, Dept Econ, 1602 Fishburne Dr, Atlanta, GA 30322 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS | 2023年 / 71卷 / 01期

关键词：

MARKET POWER; QUALITY; COMPETITION; CONSOLIDATION; PERFORMANCE; COLLUSION; MONOPOLY; MERGERS; IMPACT; TRADE;

D O I：

10.1111/joie.12318

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

Many industries consist of large firms that compete in multiple geographic markets. Such overlap, defined as multimarket contact (MMC), may facilitate tacit collusion and soften competition. We examine the effects of MMC on health insurance prices and quality using comprehensive data on the Medicare Advantage (MA) market from 2008 through 2015. Our identification strategy exploits two plausibly exogenous changes to MMC: (1) out-of-market mergers; and (2) policy-driven changes in the benchmark rates of other markets. Our results consistently support the mutual forbearance hypothesis, where we find that prices are significantly higher and high-quality plans less pervasive as MMC increases.

引用

页码：212 / 255

页数：44

共 54 条

[1] MULTIMARKET CONTACT AND COLLUSIVE BEHAVIOR [J].