TWO-STAGE STOCHASTIC NONLINEAR WINNER DETERMINATION FOR LOGISTICS SERVICE PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS UNDER QUANTITY DISCOUNTS

被引:3
作者
Qian, Xiaohu [1 ]
Yin, Mingqiang [2 ]
Li, Xin [1 ,3 ]
Zhang, Qingyu [1 ]
机构
[1] Shenzhen Univ, Res Inst Business Analyt & Supply Chain Management, Coll Management, Shenzhen 518060, Peoples R China
[2] Liaoning Petrochem Univ, Coll Informat & Control Engn, Fushun 113001, Liaoning, Peoples R China
[3] Educ Univ Hong Kong, Dept Math & Informat Technol, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
关键词
  Winner determination; uncertain demand; quantity discounts; approx-imation method; SAMPLE AVERAGE APPROXIMATION; DETERMINATION MODEL; TRANSPORTATION; UNCERTAINTY; ALLOCATION; DESIGN; RISK;
D O I
10.3934/jimo.2022252
中图分类号
T [工业技术];
学科分类号
08 ;
摘要
Quantity discount is a frequently adopted scheme that has not been explicitly investigated in logistics service procurement auctions. This paper focuses on a revised winner determination problem under quantity dis-counts and demand uncertainty for a fourth-party logistics (4PL) provider in a combinatorial reverse auction. To characterize our research problem, a two-stage stochastic nonlinear programming model is constructed. Inspired by the idea of sample average approximation (SAA), the nonlinear model is reformu-lated as a deterministic mixed integer linear programming model by using a linearization technique with superior expressions. Since the reformulation has a large number of decision variables and constraints, we integrate SAA with a dual decomposition Lagrangian relaxation technique (DDLR) to develop a solution method called SAA-DDLR. Numerical experiments are conducted to illustrate the effectiveness and applicability of our model and method. Sen-sitivity analysis reveals that both the 4PL and 3PLs can benefit from the quantity discount scheme. Managerial insights are drawn for the 4PL to run a cost-effective logistics system in the presence of quantity discounts.
引用
收藏
页码:7072 / 7089
页数:18
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