Using Preference Estimates to Customize Incentives: An Application to Polio Vaccination Drives in Pakistan

被引：7

作者：

Andreoni, James ^{[1
]}

Callen, Michael ^{[2
]}

Hussain, Karrar ^{[3
]}

Khan, Muhammad Yasir ^{[4
]}

Sprenger, Charles ^{[5
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Calif San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093 USA

[2] London Sch Econ, London, England

[3] FAU Erlangen Nuremberg, Nurnberg, Germany

[4] Univ Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA

[5] CALTECH, Pasadena, CA 91125 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION | 2023年 / 21卷 / 04期

关键词：

INDIVIDUAL DISCOUNT RATES; TIME-PREFERENCES; SELF-CONTROL; FINANCIAL INCENTIVES; BEHAVIOR; POVERTY; CHOICE;

D O I：

10.1093/jeea/jvac068

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We use estimates of time preferences to customize incentives for polio vaccinators in Lahore, Pakistan. We measure time preferences using intertemporal allocations of effort, and use these estimates to construct individually tailored incentives. We evaluate the effect of matching contract terms to discounting parameters in a subsequent experiment with the same vaccinators. Our tailored policy is compared with alternatives that either rely on atheoretic reduced-form relationships for policy guidance or apply the same policy to all individuals. We find that contracts tailored to individual discounting outperform this range of policy alternatives.

引用

页码：1428 / 1477

页数：50

共 58 条

[1]

Abhijit Banerjee, 2016, 22167 NBER

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