Evolution of cooperation in a two-species system with a common resource pool

被引:3
作者
Salles, Luis Francisco Prado [1 ]
de Aguiar, Marcus Aloizio Martinez [2 ]
Marquitti, Flavia Maria Darcie [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Estadual Campinas, Inst Fis Gleb Wataghin, Campinas, Brazil
[2] Univ Estadual Campinas, Inst Biol, Campinas, Brazil
基金
巴西圣保罗研究基金会;
关键词
Evolutionary game theory; Species interactions; Evolutionary dynamics; Cooperation; PUBLIC-GOODS; COMPETITION; STRATEGIES; MECHANISMS; MAINTENANCE; COEXISTENCE; RESPONSES; DYNAMICS; ECOLOGY; GAMES;
D O I
10.1016/j.jtbi.2023.111670
中图分类号
Q [生物科学];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
Understanding the evolution of cooperation is a major question in Evolutionary Biology. Here, we extend a previously proposed mathematical model in Evolutionary Game Theory that investigated how resource use by a single species composed of cooperators and defectors may lead to its maintenance or extinction. We include another species in the model, so as to investigate how different intra and interspecific interactions of cooperative or competitive nature among individuals that share the same essential resource may drive the survival and evolution of the species. Several outcomes emerge from the model, depending on the configuration of the payoff matrix, the individual contribution to the resource pool, the competition intensity between species, and the initial conditions of the system dynamics. Observed results include scenarios in which species thrive due to the action of cooperators, but also scenarios in which both species collapse due to lack of cooperation and, consequently, of resources. In particular, a high initial availability of resources may be the determinant factor to the survival of both species. Interestingly, cooperation may be more favored when individuals have less incentive to cooperate with others, and the survival of their populations may depend crucially on their competitive capacities.
引用
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页数:10
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