Design of Creative Incentive Contract of Cultural and Creative Industry Chain from Dual Perspective

The duality of cultural and creative industry can maintain the independence of creative birth and management as well as taking into account of the artistic and marketability of creativity. Income distribution contracts that link the design process to the commercial value of creative ideas can solve the problem of quantitative incentives for creative subjects. At the same time, it can encourage creative subjects to complete commercial and artistic design activities. The principal-agent relationship between the upstream and downstream of the industrial chain is utilized to stimulate the creation of creative ideas in line with market conditions, so as to solve the problem of duality reconciliation of cultural and creative industries. Through the design of the cultural creative industry chain dual task creative incentive contract, in the process of encouraging creative design subjects to complete the design of the work to give consideration to the coordination of duality. By analyzing the influences of design capability, risk, cost coefficient and binary correlation on the optimal investment level and the optimal risk sharing level of creative subjects in two types of design activities, the input transfer caused by the variation of the above conditions is further discussed.