Differential Fault Attack on the Stream Cipher LIZARD

In this paper, we try to give a security evaluation of LIZARD stream cipher in regard to fault attacks, which, to the best of our knowledge, is the first fault analysis on LIZARD. We design a differential engine of LIZARD to track the differential trail of the keystreams. It is shown that the distributions of the keystream differences are heavily biased. Utilizing this characteristic, we propose an improved method to identify the fault location for LIZARD whose success probability approaches 1. Then we use the fault-free keystream and faulty keystreams to generate system of equations in internal state variables and solve it by SAT solver. The result shows that with 100 keystream bits, only 6 different faults are needed to recover the internal state. Finally,the comparison between LIZARD and Grain v1 shows that LIZARD is more resistable than Grain v1 in regard to fault attacks.