Incentive Contracts for Venture Capital Syndication

被引：0

作者：

张新立 ^{[1
]}

杨德礼 ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] School of Management, Dalian University of Techology,Dalian 116024, China School of Mathematics, Liaoning Normal University,Dalian 116021, China

[2] School of Management, Dalian University of Techology,Dalian 116024, China

来源：

Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University(English Edition) | 2007年 / 01期

关键词：

Venture capital; Syndication; Asymmetric information; Incentive contract;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

F832.48 [投资];

学科分类号：

120204 ;

摘要：

Aiming at the incentive problems of venture capital syndication at the second and later stages, an game model is set up by principal agent and incentive theory, given that the lead venture capitalist has already some knowledge of the project quality from his initial funding of the project. Under symmetric and asymmetric information, the model analyzes how the optimal syndication contracts induce venture capitalists to truthfully reveal their information to each other, and vary with the level of venture capitalists’ expertise and information in evaluating projects.

引用

页码：49 / 54

页数：6