The well-known Braess paradox in congestion games states that adding an additional road to a transportation network may increase the total travel time, and consequently decrease the overall efficiency. This paper presents a paradox in a similar spirit and involves a distributed resource allocation game on networks, namely the power allocation game between countries developed in Li and Morse(2017). The paradox is that by having additional friends may actually decrease a country’s total welfare in equilibrium. Conditions for this paradox to occur as well as the price of anarchy results are also derived.
机构:
Xi An Jiao Tong Univ, Sch Management, Xian, Peoples R ChinaGuangzhou Univ, Sch Management, Guangzhou, Peoples R China
Pan, Jiayin
Chen, Cong
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Guangzhou Univ, Sch Management, Guangzhou, Peoples R China
South China Univ Technol, Sch Business Adm, Guangzhou, Peoples R ChinaGuangzhou Univ, Sch Management, Guangzhou, Peoples R China
Chen, Cong
Xu, Yinfeng
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Xi An Jiao Tong Univ, Sch Management, Xian, Peoples R China
State Key Lab Mfg Syst Engn, Xian, Peoples R ChinaGuangzhou Univ, Sch Management, Guangzhou, Peoples R China