Payoff-based accumulative effect promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma

被引：0

作者：

刘永奎 ^{[1
]}

李智 ^{[1
]}

陈小杰 ^{[2
]}

王龙 ^{[1
,2
]}

机构：

[1] Center for Complex Systems,Department of Automatic Control Engineering,Xidian University

[2] State Key Laboratory for Turbulence and Complex Systems,Center for Systems and Control,College of Engineering,Peking University

来源：

Chinese Physics B | 2010年 / 19卷 / 09期

基金：

中国国家自然科学基金; 国家高技术研究发展计划(863计划);

关键词：

payoff; accumulative effect; prisoner’s dilemma; cooperation;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

O225 [对策论（博弈论）];

学科分类号：

070105 ; 1201 ;

摘要：

We study the effect of accumulative payoff on the evolution of cooperation in the evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma on a square lattice. We introduce a decaying factor for the accumulative payoff, which characterizes the extent that the historical payoff is accumulated. It is shown that for fixed values of the temptation to defect, the density of cooperators increases with the value of the decaying factor. This indicates that the more the historical payoff is involved, the more favourable cooperators become. In the critical region where the cooperator density converges to zero, cooperators vanish according to a power-law-like behaviour. The associated exponents agree approximately with the two-dimensional directed percolation and depend weakly on the value of the decaying factor.

引用

页码：57 / 62

页数：6