Evolutionary Game on Oil and Gas Companies' Pollution Treatment

被引:0
作者
张涛 [1 ]
郭春亮 [1 ]
全林 [2 ]
付芳 [1 ]
机构
[1] School of Economics & Management,China University of Petroleum (East China)
[2] School of Marxism,Shanghai Jiaotong University
基金
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助;
关键词
oil and gas companies; pollution treatment; evolutionary game; policy suggestions;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
X322 [部门环境规划与管理];
学科分类号
083305 ;
摘要
This paper presents a dynamic model of pollution treatment strategies,driven by the bargaining relationships between governments,oil and gas companies and local residents.The results show that government plays a dominating role and government environmental policies have significant impact on other two parties’ behavior.To achieve better pollution treatment in the future,we put forward the following suggestions.An improvement in the legal system is required,and the legal enforcement needs to be strengthened.In terms of pollution treatment,responsibilities and obligations of these three parties need to be clearly defined.A wellfunctioned reward and penalties system needs to be established for minimizing the environment damage in the future.
引用
收藏
页码:750 / 756
页数:7
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