Get your hands off my laptop: Physical side-channel key-extraction attacks on pcs

被引：51

作者：

Genkin, Daniel ^{[1
]}

Pipman, Itamar ^{[2
]}

Tromer, Eran ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Technion, Israel

[2] Tel Aviv University, Israel

来源：

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) | 2014年 / 8731卷

关键词：

Signal processing - Side channel attack - Electric potential;

D O I：

10.1007/978-3-662-44709-3_14

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

We demonstrate physical side-channel attacks on a popular software implementation of RSA and ElGamal, running on laptop computers. Our attacks use novel side channels, based on the observation that the ground electric potential, in many computers, fluctuates in a computation-dependent way. An attacker can measure this signal by touching exposed metal on the computer’s chassis with a plain wire, or even with a bare hand. The signal can also be measured at the remote end of Ethernet, VGA or USB cables. Through suitable cryptanalysis and signal processing, we have extracted 4096-bit RSA keys and 3072-bit ElGamal keys from laptops, via each of these channels, as well as via power analysis and electromagnetic probing. Despite the GHz-scale clock rate of the laptops and numerous noise sources, the full attacks require a few seconds of measurements using Medium Frequency signals (around 2 MHz), or one hour using Low Frequency signals (up to 40 kHz). © International Association for Cryptologic Research 2014.

引用

页码：242 / 260