Principal-agent model with channel network based on retailers having fairness preference

被引：0

作者：

Wang, Kai-Hong ^{[1
]}

Ding, Chuan ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Research Institute of Operation and Decision, Southwest University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu

来源：

Kongzhi yu Juece/Control and Decision | 2015年 / 30卷 / 03期

关键词：

Channel network; Fairness preference; Incentive; Principal-multi-agent;

D O I：

10.13195/j.kzyjc.2013.1305

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

For the condition that the downstream retailers have more information than the upstream manufacturer in the channel, the principal multi-agent model is structured based on the channels practice firstly. Then, the retailers' fairness preference is considered, fairness preference model of Fehr and Schmidt and the principal-agent model are combined, and the behavior incentive model is constructed based on the fairness preference. The research shows that, comparing with the complete rationality, when the retailers have a fairness preference, retailers improve the level of efforts, and manufacturers increase the incentive for retailers, so that product sales increase, the incomes of retailers are improved, and the total channel revenue is also improved. ©, 2015, Northeast University. All right reserved.

引用

页码：565 / 571

页数：6

共 21 条

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