Balancing Interests in Rural Tourism: An Evolutionary Game Analysis of Stakeholder Under Dynamic Punishment Mechanism

Rural tourism development involves multiple stakeholder groups, and balancing the interests of all parties is essential for its sustainable growth. This paper develops a dynamic evolutionary game model for government, enterprises, and villagers based on stakeholder theory. By introducing a dynamic penalty function, the model describes the nonlinear evolution of supervision intensity. Through system dynamics simulation, the study uncovers the strategic evolution of each party and quantifies the impact of external variables on system stability. Results show that behavioural fluctuations among stakeholders intensify conflicts between development and protection, complicating governance. However, the dynamic punishment mechanism significantly reduces these fluctuations, stabilizes strategic interactions, and fosters equilibrium. Furthermore, increasing punishment severity promotes legal compliance among tourism enterprises and garners active support from local villagers. The distribution of power, interests, and responsibilities among stakeholders, along with their relative importance in decision-making, plays a critical role in determining how external variables affect the equilibrium strategy and the speed at which the system stabilizes. The research demonstrates that the dynamic punishment mechanism effectively coordinates the conflicting interests of multiple stakeholders. The supervisory loop offers both theoretical innovation and practical solutions to address the challenges of rural tourism governance.