Optimal Deceptive Strategy Synthesis for Autonomous Systems Under Asymmetric Information

被引:0
作者
Lv P. [1 ]
Li S. [1 ]
Yin X. [1 ]
机构
[1] Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Key Laboratory of System Control and Information Processing, Department of Automation, Shanghai
来源
IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Vehicles | 2024年 / 9卷 / 10期
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
asymmetric information; Autonomous systems; strategy synthesis; UGVs;
D O I
10.1109/TIV.2024.3362585
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
High-level task planning under adversarial environments is one of the central problems in the development of autonomous systems such as unmanned ground vehicles (UGV). Existing works commonly assume that the decision-maker such as UAV shares the same information with the environment. However, in many scenarios, the UGV, as an integral part of the system, generally has more information than the external adversary. For such a scenario, the decision-maker with more information may achieve better performance by using deceptive strategies. In this article, we investigate the problem of optimal deceptive strategy synthesis for autonomous systems under asymmetric information between the internal decision-maker and the external adversary. Specifically, we model the dynamic system as a weighted two-player graph game and the objective is to optimize the mean payoff value per task. To capture the asymmetric information between two parties, we assume that the UGV has complete knowledge of the system, whereas the adversary may have misconceptions regarding the task as well as the cost. To synthesize an optimal deceptive strategy, we propose a synthesis algorithm based on hyper-games. The correctness as well as the complexity of the algorithm are analyzed. We illustrate the proposed algorithm by running examples as well as a simulation case study. Finally, we conduct an empirical experiment using real-world scenarios to verify the practical applicability of our algorithm. © 2016 IEEE.
引用
收藏
页码:6108 / 6121
页数:13
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