The multi-step Shapley value of transferable utility cooperative games with a level structure

被引：0

作者：

Hu X. ^{[1
]}

Li D. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] School of Economics and Management, Fuzhou University, Fuzhou

来源：

Xitong Gongcheng Lilun yu Shijian/System Engineering Theory and Practice | 2016年 / 36卷 / 07期

基金：

中国国家自然科学基金; 高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金;

关键词：

Coalition structure; Cooperative game; Level structure; Shapley value; Two-step Shapley value; Weighted Shapley value;

D O I：

10.12011/1000-6788(2016)07-1863-08

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

As an alliance form for players, a level structure is more general than a coalition structure. This paper devotes to propose the multi-step Shapley value of transferable utility cooperative games with a level structure. Concretely, an allocation procedure and an axiomatic characterization of it are given. Additionally, as an equivalent allocation procedure, this paper proves that it is identical with the weighted Shapley value of an appropriate transferable utility cooperative game. Research results extend the two-step Shapley value of transferable utility cooperative games with a coalition structure, and they can be taken as references to investigate other solutions of transferable utility cooperative games with an alliance restriction. © 2016, Editorial Board of Journal of Systems Engineering Society of China. All right reserved.

引用

页码：1863 / 1870

页数：7

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