Virtual bidding and electricity market design

被引：51
作者：
Hogan W.W. [1 ]
机构：
[1] Global Energy Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
来源：
Electricity Journal | 2016年 / 29卷 / 05期
关键词：
Bidding; Design; Efficiency; Electricity; Equilibrium; Market; PJM; Uplift; Virtual;
D O I：
10.1016/j.tej.2016.05.009
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
Efficient electricity day-ahead market designs include virtual transactions. These are financial contracts awarded at day-ahead prices and settled at real-time prices. Under current PJM market rules, there is an asymmetry in the settlement treatment of different types of virtual transactions, but a recent recommendation by PJM to eliminate this asymmetry is problematical. © 2016 Elsevier Inc.
引用
收藏
页码：33 / 47
页数：14
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