Untraceable security proof for RFID authentication protocol

被引:0
作者
Zhai, Jingxuan [1 ]
Cao, Tianjie [1 ]
Chen, Xiuqing [2 ]
机构
[1] School of Computer Science and Technology, China University of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou
[2] School of Medicine Information, Xuzhou Medical College, Xuzhou
来源
Journal of Computational Information Systems | 2015年 / 11卷 / 09期
关键词
RFID authentication protocol; Security proof; Traceability attack; Untraceable;
D O I
10.12733/jcis14045
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
Nowadays Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) authentication protocols have developed untraceable security proof to solve the security and privacy issues. We not only analyze the advantage of the enhancement of a one-way hash based low-cost authentication protocol (EMAP), but also present a new provably untraceable protocol that is based on the original EMAP protocol. Subsequently, to verify the untraceability property of the revised protocol, we modify a formal model under a stated assumption and an untraceability definition. With this extension, we apply the enhanced formal proof model to prove that the proposed protocol is untraceable. ©, 2015, Binary Information Press. All right reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:3121 / 3129
页数:8
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