A game-theoretic approach for the government's leadership to reduce misconduct in business

被引:0
作者
Sameni, Zahra [1 ]
Taleizadeh, Ata Allah [1 ]
Hafezalkotob, Ashkan [2 ]
Sarkar, Biswajit [3 ,4 ,5 ]
机构
[1] Univ Tehran, Coll Engn, Sch Ind Engn, Tehran, Iran
[2] Islamic Azad Univ, Sch Ind Engn, South Tehran Branch, Tehran, Iran
[3] Yonsei Univ, Dept Ind Engn, 50 Yonsei Ro, Seoul 03722, South Korea
[4] Lovely Profess Univ, Dept Math, Phagwara 144411, Punjab, India
[5] Saveetha Univ, Saveetha Inst Med & Tech Sci, Saveetha Med Coll, Ctr Global Hlth Res, Chennai 600077, Tamil Nadu, India
关键词
Decision-making; convexity analysis; game policy; supply chain management; government tax; CHANNEL SUPPLY CHAIN; GREEN; INTERVENTION; COORDINATION; MULTIPRODUCT; STRATEGIES; MANAGEMENT; CONSTRAINT; INVENTORY; DISCOUNT;
D O I
10.1051/ro/2025047
中图分类号
C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];
学科分类号
070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
Climate change forces the government to regulate policies in society furthermore, it has been proven that e-commerce is more carbon-efficient than traditional retail, so encouraging manufacturers to implement sustainable practices needs the effort of the government. The main issue of dual-channel is pricing. This study investigates the impact of government intervention on decision-making in the highly polluting leather industry, particularly within a dual-channel supply chain structure. To investigate the optimal decision between retailer and manufacturer in the dual-channel supply chain with government intervention, this study compares the effect of coordination contracts. In this model, the government, as a leader of the market, considers policy for the welfare of society. Maximizing the community's well-being based on consumer surplus. This policy determines how much a customer pays for the tax of buying the green product. Green manufacturers open an online channel selling part of green products beside the retailer (offline channel). The result shows that a low-carbon contract is an effective mechanism to maximize social welfare and increase supply chain members' profit. In the low-carbon contract, the decrease in the wholesale price causes the demand from offline channels to increase. In addition, low-carbon contracts have a powerful impact on the decrease in taxes paid by customers. Notably, reverse revenue and greening cost sharing, among other contracts, can increase the online demand for green manufacturers, while profit-sharing contracts can balance online and offline channels in the supply chain.
引用
收藏
页码:1775 / 1802
页数:28
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