Understanding Side-Channel Vulnerabilities in Superconducting Qubit Readout Architectures

被引:0
作者
Maurya, Satvik [1 ]
Mude, Chaithanya Naik [1 ]
Lienhard, Benjamin [2 ,3 ]
Tannu, Swamit [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Wisconsin Madison, Dept Comp Sci, Madison, WI 53706 USA
[2] Princeton Univ, Dept Chem, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA
[3] Princeton Univ, Dept Elect & Comp Engn, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA
来源
2024 IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON QUANTUM COMPUTING AND ENGINEERING, QCE, VOL 1 | 2024年
基金
瑞士国家科学基金会;
关键词
Frequency-multiplexed readout; superconducting qubits; readout crosstalk; side-channel attacks;
D O I
10.1109/QCE60285.2024.00138
中图分类号
TP301 [理论、方法];
学科分类号
081202 ;
摘要
Frequency-multiplexing is an effective method to achieve resource-efficient superconducting qubit readout. Allowing multiple resonators to share a common feedline, the number of cables and passive components involved in the readout of a qubit can be drastically reduced. However, this improvement in scalability comes at the price of a crucial non-ideality - an increased readout crosstalk. Prior works have targeted building better devices and discriminators to reduce its effects, as readout-crosstalk-induced qubit measurement errors are detrimental to the reliability of a quantum computer. However, in this work, we show that beyond the reliability of a system, readout crosstalk can introduce vulnerabilities in a system being shared among multiple users. These vulnerabilities are directly related to correlated errors due to readout crosstalk. These correlated errors can be exploited by nefarious attackers to predict the state of the victim qubits, resulting in information leakage.
引用
收藏
页码:1177 / 1183
页数:7
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