Personalized Pricing and the Value of Time: Evidence From Auctioned Cab Rides

被引:0
作者
Buchholz, Nicholas [1 ]
Doval, Laura [2 ]
Kastl, Jakub [1 ,3 ,4 ]
Matejka, Filip [5 ,6 ]
Salz, Tobias [3 ,7 ]
机构
[1] Princeton Univ, Dept Econ, Princeton 08544, NJ USA
[2] Columbia Univ, Grad Sch Business, Econ Div, New York, NY USA
[3] NBER, Cambridge, England
[4] CEPR, London, England
[5] Charles Univ Prague, Prague, Czech Republic
[6] Acad Sci Czech Republ, Econ Inst, Prague, Czech Republic
[7] MIT, Dept Econ, Cambridge, MA USA
关键词
Value of time; transportation markets; demand in transportation markets; ride hail; platforms; price discrimination; MECHANISM CHOICE; DISCRIMINATION; FRICTIONS; DEMAND;
D O I
10.3982/ECTA18838
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We recover valuations of time using detailed data from a large ride-hail platform, where drivers bid on trips and consumers choose between a set of rides with different prices and wait times. Leveraging a consumer panel, we estimate demand as a function of both prices and wait times and use the resulting estimates to recover heterogeneity in the value of time across consumers. We study the welfare implications of personalized pricing and its effect on the platform, drivers, and consumers. Taking into account drivers' optimal reaction to the platform's pricing policy, personalized pricing lowers consumer surplus by 2.5% and increases overall surplus by 5.2%. Like the platform, drivers benefit from personalized pricing. By conditioning prices on drivers' wait times and not on consumers' data, the platform can capture a significant portion of the profits garnered from personalized pricing, and simultaneously benefit consumers.
引用
收藏
页码:929 / 958
页数:30
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