The Political Economy of Economic Policy Advice

被引：0

作者：

Dercon, Stefan ^{[1
,2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Oxford, Ctr Study African Econ, Blavatnik Sch Govt, Oxford OX2 6GG, England

[2] Univ Oxford, Dept Econ, Oxford OX2 6GG, England

来源：

JOURNAL OF AFRICAN ECONOMIES | 2024年 / 33卷

关键词：

policy advice; economics; political economy; Africa;

D O I：

10.1093/jae/ejae027

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This article examines the political economy of economic policy advice. It offers a framework for assessing how to maximise the economic development impact of advice, allowing for the political incentives of those in power. It argues for a 'second best' analysis that looks to maximise development impact given political incentives and shows how standard advice often given by researchers, government advisors or international organisations such as the World Bank and the IMF may not be this second best option. Furthermore, it looks at the implications of treating political constraints as endogenous. Some examples illustrate how research and advice can be more impactful by considering local political economy conditions.

引用

页码：ii26 / ii38

页数：13