Poster: Solving the Free-rider Problem in Bittensor

被引：0

作者：

Liu, Sin Tai ^{[1
]}

Yu, Jiayuan ^{[2
]}

Steeves, Jacob ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Opentensor Fdn, Toronto, ON, Canada

[2] Concordia Univ, Informat Syst Engn, Montreal, PQ, Canada

来源：

PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2024 ACM SIGSAC CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY, CCS 2024 | 2024年

关键词：

Peer-to-peer network; Free-riding; Cryptography; Blockchain; Game theory; Artificial Intelligence;

D O I：

10.1145/3658644.3691414

中图分类号：

TP18 [人工智能理论];

学科分类号：

081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;

摘要：

The design and operation of Bittensor is a decentralized and anonymous system where actors are incentivized by rewards to provide utilities. To ensure that it is a fair game, utilities obtained by copying other participants should be identified and punished. Our first contribution is to apply a commitment scheme to address this free-rider problem. Under appropriate conditions, we show theoretically and empirically that a commitment scheme dissuades copying by reducing the rewards to the copier. In particular, this dissuasive power is a function of the duration between the commit- and reveal-steps. Our second contribution is to propose the liquid alpha solution to amplify the effect of the commitment scheme.

引用

页码：5045 / 5047

页数：3