A generalization to networks of Young's characterization of the Borda rule

被引:1
作者
Bubboloni, Daniela [1 ]
Gori, Michele [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Firenze, Dipartimento Matemat & Informat U Dini, Viale Morgagni 67-a, I-50134 Florence, Italy
[2] Univ Firenze, Dipartimento Sci Econ & Impresa, Via Pandette 9, I-50127 Florence, Italy
关键词
Network; Network solution; Net-outdegree; Social choice theory; Borda rule; Approval voting; D71; SCORING RULES; RANKING; AGGREGATION; CHOICE;
D O I
10.1007/s10479-025-06593-w
中图分类号
C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];
学科分类号
070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
We prove that, for any given set of networks satisfying suitable conditions, the net-oudegree network solution, the net-indegree network solution, and the total network solution are the unique network solutions on that set satisfying neutrality, consistency and cancellation. The generality of the result obtained allows to get an analogous result for social choice correspondences: for any given set of preference profiles satisfying suitable conditions, the net-oudegree social choice correspondence, the net-indegree social choice correspondence and the total social choice correspondence are the unique social choice correspondences on that set satisfying neutrality, consistency and cancellation. Using the notable fact that several well-known voting rules coincide with the restriction of the net-outdegree social choice correspondence to appropriate sets of preference profiles, we are able to deduce a variety of new and known characterization theorems for the Borda rule, the Partial Borda rule, the Averaged Borda rule, the Approval Voting, the Plurality rule and the anti-Plurality rule, among which Young's characterization of the Borda rule and Fishburn's characterization of the Approval Voting.
引用
收藏
页码:1501 / 1552
页数:52
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