Does agnosticism have positive evidence?

Alexandra Zinke argues that there are different ways of justifying suspension of judgment. In Zinke (Theoria 87:1050-1066, 2021), she claims that one suspends judgment not only as a result of a lack of evidence (privatively) but also positively, that is because there is evidence that provides reasons for suspending judgment. Zinke's argument suggests that suspension goes beyond being a rational default in cases of insufficient evidence. I align with Zinke's perspective on affirming that agnosticism is not simply a fallback position. Yet, I argue that her attempt to justify it through positive evidence fails. However, this paper argues that (i) the vagueness and chance-driven evidences of agnosticism espoused by Zinke exhibit non-rational aspects. I will draw parallels between these evidences and Bayesian agnosticism articulated by Fraassen (Analysis 58:212-220, 1998), as well as the degrees of belief account expounded by H & aacute;jek (Analysis 58:199-206, 1998) to show these aspects and contend that Zinke's evidences align with certain trivialities clarified within the aforementioned conceptual frameworks and (ii) due to the unique nature of agnosticism, the relationship between agnosticism, evidence, and rationality takes place on a different ground from theism and atheism. Therefore, even if there is no positive evidence for agnosticism, it is still justified by a reference to two truth conditions: belief and awareness.