Transparency by Chinese cities reduces pollution violations and improves air quality

被引:0
作者
Liu, Mengdi [1 ]
Buntaine, Mark T. [2 ]
Anderson, Sarah E. [2 ]
Zhang, Bing [3 ,4 ]
机构
[1] Univ Int Business & Econ, Sch Int Trade & Econ, Beijing 100029, Peoples R China
[2] Univ Calif Santa Barbara, Sch Environm Sci & Management, Santa Barbara, CA 93106 USA
[3] Nanjing Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Int Trade & Econ, Nanjing 210023, Peoples R China
[4] Nanjing Univ, State Key Lab Water Pollut Control & Green Resourc, Shanghai 200092, Peoples R China
关键词
transparency; air quality; environmental governance; China; ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE; FIELD EXPERIMENT; PUBLIC DISCLOSURE; ORGANIZATIONS; CORRUPTION; GOVERNANCE; POWER;
D O I
10.1073/pnas.2406761122
中图分类号
O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
We provide national-scale experimental evidence from China showing that transparency by local governments improves the management of air pollution. Governments that perform better have more reasons to be transparent, making the causal relationship between transparency and policy outcomes difficult to disentangle. In 2015, we randomly assigned municipal governments in China to a high-visibility, public rating of their adherence to national requirements for transparency about their regulation of pollution. By 2016, this treatment significantly boosted transparency in treated cities relative to control cities, allowing us to observe the effect of randomly increasing transparency in the years that followed. Subsequently, high-polluting firms in treated cities cut their violations by 37% compared to similar firms in control cities. Inspections by local governments increased by about 90% in treated cities relative to control cities. Ambient air pollution decreased between 8 and 10% in treated cities relative to control cities, which likely generated significant health benefits. This study provides strong evidence that governmental transparency causes improved environmental quality, at least in a setting where the public and higher governments want to hold local governments accountable.
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页数:10
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