Aristotle on the Perfections of Virtuous Action

In Nicomachean Ethics 2.4 Aristotle distinguishes between virtuous action and acting virtuously: a virtuous action counts as virtuously performed if done with knowledge, chosen for its own sake, and from a stable character. Since the `same' action can be performed virtuously or non-virtuously, interpreters have concluded that these `agential conditions' are indifferent incidental features with no bearing on the virtuous character of the action. I propose that they are instead `perfections,' i.e., constitutive features of virtuous action as such, admitting of degrees. Unlike the alternative interpretation, my proposal fully harmonizes with three important Aristotelian doctrines: that action from virtue is prior to action merely in conformity with virtue; that character virtue is a perfection of human beings; and that practical life is not properly characterized in transitive, productive terms. My proposal still allows for a generic sense of `sameness' in which the `same' action may be virtuously or non-virtuously performed.